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Abstract 
Food manufacturing by agriculture cooperatives is portrayed as an enterprise 
that is owned by the suppliers of raw agricultural products. Typically, in this 
type of enterprise, decision making is democratically made by the member 
farmers, and the surplus is divided among them according to the amount of 
raw agricultural products they supply to the firm. In this paper, we seek to 
find comparative efficiency and inefficiency of food manufacturing firms run 
by agriculture cooperatives. 
JEL classification numbers: L22, P13 
Key words: agriculture cooperatives, food manufacturing industry 
1 Introduction 
Food manufacturing by agriculture cooperatives is portrayed as an enterprise 
that is owned by the suppliers of raw agricultural products. 1 Typically, in 
this type of enterprise, decision making is democratically made by the mem-
ber farmers (i.e., one member-one vote), and the surplus is divided among 
them according to the amount of raw agricultural products they supply to 
the firm. (Figure 1.) The performance of farmer owned firms may therefore 
well be different from that of orthodox investor owned firms, where decision 
making is ultimately subject to one share-one vote by the shareholders, and 
the profit is divided among them according to the equity shares they hold. 
Based on empirical observations, this paper attempts to find comparative 
efficiency and inefficiency of food manufacturing firms run by agriculture 
cooperatives. 2 
IThe agriculture cooperatives are the largest cooperative organization in Japan. As 
of 1998, there were over 2000 agriculture cooperatives with more than 5 million members 
nationwide. Each agriculture cooperative is hierarchically organized under the prefectural 
union, and each prefectural union is further hierarchically organized under the national 
union. (So the whole agriculture cooperative is a three-tier organization.) Business ac-
tivities of agriculture cooperatives range from credit, insurance, the collective purchasing 
of production materials and livelihood necessities, the collective marketing of agricultural 
products, agricultural warehousing, processing and manufacturing of agricultural prod-
ucts, to supplying of housing lots. Total business profit from these activities amounted 
to 2.3 trillion yen (or about 22 million dollars) in 1997. (Data based on Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (1997).) 
20verall, manufacturing industries are under relatively weak governmental regulations 
compared with other industries. According to Economic Planning Agency (1994), the 
share of regulated industries in manufacturing industries was 14.1%. The shares of regu-
lated industries in other industries were 87.1% for agriculture, forestry and fisheries, 100% 
for mining, 100% for construction, 100% for electricity, gas, heat supply and water, 97.3% 
for transport and communications, 100% for finance and insurance, 7.5% for real estate, 
55.6% for service, and 0% for government. (The share for wholesale and retail trade, 
eating and drinking places was not available in the report.) The relatively low level of 
regulation in manufacturing industries implicitly means that the observed distribution of 
various forms of enterprise can be interpreted as a result of the free choice of enterprise 
form. 
1 
The next section applies the analytical framework of Hansmann (1988) 
to the present context of food manufacturing by agriculture cooperatives. 
Section 3 takes five food manufacturing industry groups that are important 
for Japanese agriculture cooperatives, and examines economic reasons for 
their active involvement with each of these undertakings. Section 4 concludes 
the paper with some remarks. 
2 Efficiency of agriculture cooperatives in food 
manufacturing 
Under farmers' ownership of a food manufacturing firm, input of raw agricul-
tural products is provided to the firm through ownership (i. e., self-sufficiently), 
whereas capital input, as well as labor input, is provided to the firm through 
the market, and output is traded in the market, too. (Figure 1.) 3 This is 
in contrast to the transactions of input and output under capital suppliers' 
ownership of the firm (i.e., investor owned firm), in which capital input is 
provided to the firm through ownership, whereas input of raw agricultural 
products, as well as labor input, is provided to the firm through the market, 
and, of course, output is traded in the market. Farmers' ownership of the 
firm is therefore a system of transactions of input and output which saves the 
costs that are associated with market transactions of raw agricultural prod-
ucts and instead incurs the costs that are associated with collective ownership 
of the firm by the farmers. 4 Hence, a comparative efficiency for agriculture 
30wnership of the firm consists of the right to control the firm and the right to claim the 
residual earnings of the firm. This concept is different and must be clearly distinguished 
from ownership of physical assets for production of the firm, as discussed in Hart and 
Moore (1990). 
4In contrast, capital suppliers' ownership of the firm is a system which saves the costs 
that are associated with market transactions of capital input and incurs the costs that are 
associated with collective ownership of the firm by the capital suppliers. 
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cooperatives in undertaking a food manufacturing business can arIse when 
(a) the costs that are associated with market transactions ofraw agricultural 
products are large (relative to the costs that are associated with market 
transactions of capital), and (b) the costs that are associated with collective 
ownership of the firm by the farmers are small (relative to the costs that are 
associated with collective ownership of the firm by the capital suppliers). 5 
Hansmann (1988) listed several representative factors that constitute the 
costs of market and firm ownership. In what follows, we apply those factors 
to the specific context of food manufacturing by agriculture cooperatives. 
The first three factors (market power, ex post market power, and asymmet-
ric information) are concerned with the costs of market, whereas the last 
two factors (monitoring and risk bearing) are concerned with the costs of 
ownership. 6 
Market power 
The major cost of using the market of raw agricultural products that 
5Firm ownership by the farmers implies a vertical integration of production of raw 
agricultural products and production of processed foods. In this sense, we henceforth use 
the term 'vertical integration' of food processing by agricultural cooperatives to mean the 
farmers' ownership of the firm. 
60f course, there are other factors besides those listed by Hansmann (1988) that affect 
the efficient form of enterprise. In particular, influences from the institutional framework 
and legal system seem nonnegligible. Unlike stock companies, cooperatives are not allowed 
to issue bonds to finance capital, and therefore their way of externally financing capital 
is limited to borrowing from financial institutions. Agriculture cooperatives are legally 
prohibited from borrowing a large amount of funds for investment, though. In addition, 
their scope of undertakings and area of activity are strictly restricted. These restrictions 
seem to discourage agriculture cooperatives from undertaking food manufacturing. On 
the other hand, a corporate income tax rate is applied to agriculture cooperatives that is 
lower than the rate imposed on stock companies. Furthermore, under some conditions, 
agriculture cooperatives are exempted from an application of the anti-trust law. These 
factors seem to work in favor of the advancement of agriculture cooperatives into the 
food manufacturing business. In this paper, however, we focus our mind on the economic 
reasons and do not deal explicitly with these institutional aspects. 
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is associated with market power seems to arise from monopsonistic power 
imposed on farmers by large food manufacturers. The cost therefore is con-
sidered large when the number of manufacturers is small and, as a result, 
the product market is monopolistic. If agriculture cooperatives vertically 
integrate the manufacturing stage, this inefficiency can be prevented. 
Ex post market power 
The major cost of using the market of raw agricultural products that is 
associated with ex post market power seems to arise from an underinvest-
ment in production facilities as a response to a possible termination of trade 
of raw agricultural products. That is, if an investment in a food manufac-
turing facility is specific to the relationship with a local group of farmers 
which supplies certain raw agricultural products, the investment level tends 
to become smaller than the socially efficient level in order to be ready for 
a termination of transactions in the raw agricultural products. The cost, 
therefore, will be larger when there is a strong relational specificity between 
the facilities and the local agricultural products, and presumably when the 
efficient size of production facilities is large. If farmers own the physical 
assets for production themselves, presumably by borrowing funds from out-
side, and vertically integrate the manufacturing stage, this inefficiency can 
be prevented, or at least more or less be reduced. 7 8 
Asymmetric information 
The major cost of using the market of raw agricultural products that 
7Putterman (1984) and Hansmann (1988) discussed the possibility that a class of in-
dividuals owns physical assets for production entirely by borrowing in a noncapitalistic 
firm. 
8 Another possibility to avoid opportunism would be to let capital owners become farm-
ers as well, but this seems unrealistic. In particular, ownership of a farm by joint stock 
companies is prohibited by law in Japan. 
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is associated with incomplete information seems to arise from asymmetry 
of information on the characteristics and quality of raw agricultural prod-
ucts. If the quality of agricultural products is only known to the farmers but 
not to independent manufacturers, there can arise informational problems 
such as moral hazard or adverse selection in the market transaction of raw 
agricultural products. The cost therefore will be larger when the quality of 
raw agricultural products is hard to observe by the third parties, and when 
that information affects to a large extent the production costs and the qual-
ity of the final products. If agriculture cooperatives vertically integrate the 
manufacturing stage, this inefficiency can more or less be reduced. 
Monitoring 9 
Under the separation of ownership and control, there inevitably arIse 
the cost of investigation whether the management is appropriately executed 
for the sake of the firm owners. One possible case in the present context 
where the monitoring cost under farmers' ownership seems small is when 
the production facilities are located in the farmers' home area, since in that 
case the farmers are in a good position to check the daily operations of the 
factories. 
Risk bearing 
Agriculture cooperatives consist of family-managed farmers, and their 
livelihood depends to a large extent upon the activities of the cooperative 
they belong to. The member farmers are therefore not in a good position to 
9Besides monitoring, Hansmann (1988) listed collective decision making as a source of 
cost for firm ownership. In a sense, however, the problem of collective decision making is 
closely related to the problem of monitoring, as Hansmann himself mentions. In this paper, 
we deal with the problem of collective decision making only in the context of monitoring 
under the separation of ownership and control. 
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diversify the risks from the undertakings of food manufacturing, compared to 
the investors of stock companies. Consequently, agriculture cooperatives are 
intrinsically more risk-averse than stock companies in undertaking the food 
manufacturing business. 10 The cost of farmers' ownership that is associated 
with risk bearing thus will be larger when the food manufacturing business 
is accompanied with substantial risks, and presumably when a large amount 
of investment is required to undertake the business. 
3 Empirical observations and theoretical in-
terpretations 
The scope of food manufacturing industries is confined here to twelve small 
(three-digit) industry groups coded from 121 to 129, and from 131 to 133, in 
the Standard Industrial Classification for Japan (SIC) revised in 1993 (Table 
3). In this section, from these food manufacturing industries, we take five 
detailed (four-digit) industry groups of the SIC which bring large proceeds 
to the agriculture cooperatives (Table 1). We then examine the economic 
reasons for the comparative efficiency of agriculture cooperatives in reference 
to the five economic factors concerning costs of market and firm ownership 
discussed in the previous section. 
Meat products [1211], Dairy products [1212] 
The categories of meat processing and milk processing in Ministry of Agri-
culture, Forestry and Fisheries (1997) correspond to the divisions of meat 
products [1211] and dairy products [1212], respectively, of the SIC (Tables 
1 and 3). The agriculture cooperatives' sales of meat processing and milk 
lOIn particular, managers of agriculture cooperatives assume unlimited liability for the 
results of the cooperative's undertakings. 
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processing amount to 24.0 and 24.5 billion yen, respectively, which constitute 
12.2% and 12.4%, respectively, of the total sales of their processed goods (Ta-
ble 1). As of 1991,43 (3.6%) agriculture cooperatives and 63 (16.1%) stock 
companies funded by agriculture cooperatives were engaged in the manufac-
turing of meat products, whereas 35 (2.9%) agriculture cooperatives and 65 
(16.9%) stock companies funded by agriculture cooperatives were engaged in 
the production of milk (Table 2). 11 The employee ratio of cooperative (and 
other types of noncapitalistic) firms is 4.3% in the manufacturing of meat 
products, whereas it is 9.0% in the manufacturing of dairy products (Table 
3, Ratio 2). 
There seems to be a substantial monopsonistic power in the markets of 
raw meat and milk. There are six meat product manufacturers which list 
their equity at the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange Market. 12 
The CR3 (sum of the market shares of the top three companies) is 44.1 % 
for ham, 57.7% for sausages, and 84.9% for corned beef. Overall, the CR4 
for meat products exceeds 60%. 13 It is often referred to that meat pro-
cessing by agriculture cooperatives is to rival the domination over the meat 
product market by downstream firms such as manufacturers, wholesalers or 
11 There are two types of farmer owned enterprise: enterprises that are directly man-
aged by agriculture cooperatives, and firms in joint stock company form that are funded 
by agriculture cooperatives (called 'cooperative companies'). Although firms of the latter 
type are legally not cooperatives but stock companies, many of them can be regarded as 
a variation of cooperative enterprise of the former type. Indeed, in many (if not all) coop-
erative companies, (1) a substantial share of the equity is owned by the parent agriculture 
cooperative, and the equity is not traded in an open market; (2) there are no dividends 
on the equity; and (3) often managers come from the parent agriculture cooperative. By 
these reasons, we do not explicitly distinguish these two types of farmer owned enterprises 
in this paper. 
12The six meat product manufactures are Itoham Foods, Nippon Meat Packers, Prima 
Meat Packers, Marudai Food Co., Hayashikane Sangyo Co., and Yonekyu Corp .. 
13Nikkan Keizai Tsushinsha (1997), chapters 9 and 15. 
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retailers. 14 Similarly, the market for dairy products is highly oligopolistic. 
Three dairy product manufacturers list their equity at the first section of 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange Market. 15 The CR:3 is 90% for cheese, 60% for 
powdered milk, 52% for butter, and 48% for milk. 16 In addition, since price 
elasticity of supply of raw milk is quite small (raw milk is easily perishable 
and must be processed very quickly after extraction), monopsony power is 
easily exercised by milk product manufacturers over the ranchers even in a 
small local economy. Indeed, it is argued that ranchers have long struggled 
with low and unstable milk prices that are offered by large manufacturers. 
For instance, it is reported that ranchers' dissatisfaction with low milk prices 
that are offered by major manufacturers was the principal motivation for 
the establishment of the current Yotsuba Milk Products Co., a major milk 
processing firm in joint stock company form funded by several agriculture 
cooperatives in Hokkaido prefecture. 17 The markets for raw meat and milk 
are thus considered highly monopsonistic, and one incentive for agriculture 
cooperatives to vertically integrate the meat and milk processing seems to be 
for avoiding monopsonistic power imposed on them by major manufacturers 
in the markets for raw meat and milk. 
Another reason for agriculture cooperatives to undertake meat and milk 
processing could be that knowledge of the nature and quality of raw meat 
and milk gives ranchers an advantage in producing differentiated or, in par-
ticular, high quality products. Generally speaking, ranchers have accurate 
and detailed information about the nature and quality of the livestock prod-
ucts they produce, whereas it seems difficult or costly for third parties to 
14Shiraishi (1985b) 
15The three dairy product manufacturers are Snow Brand Milk Products Co., Morinaga 
Milk Industry Co., and Meiji Milk Products Co .. 
16Nikkan Keizai Tsushinsha (1997), chapter 8. 
17Higurashi (1985 b). 
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fully observe it. This informational advantage enables ranchers to adopt 
production lines that are suitable to the raw livestock products, and, on 
the contrary, ranchers can produce raw meat and milk that match their 
processing technologies. 18 In fact, it is commonly observed that agricul-
ture cooperatives take a corporate strategy to vertically differentiate their 
products from the standardized products made by large manufacturers. For 
instance, the Tohaku-cho Agriculture Cooperative in Tottori prefecture has 
a policy in principle to use only the raw meat they produce as a factor of 
production, and to use salt and food additives as little as possible, in order 
to have their products gain prestige value to be of high quality and health 
conscious. 19 This is in sharp contrast to the production doctrine adopted by 
large manufacturers. Typically, large manufacturers produce a large amount 
of standardized products out of imported meat in large, highly automated 
plants, often with plenty of preservatives. This enables them to save pro-
duction and distribution costs substantially. Such a difference in production 
styles between agriculture cooperatives and large manufacturers can also be 
seen in the manufacturing of dairy products. Usually, large dairy product 
manufacturers collect raw milk extracted from various types of milch cows 
raised in a wide range of areas and mix them to produce standardized milk. 
On the contrary, dairy products processed by agriculture cooperatives are 
basically made of the raw milk they extract themselves. For instance, the 
18When consumers can observe the quality of the final products ex ante (search goods) or 
ex post (experience goods), the firm with private information has an incentive to produce 
high quality goods, no matter who owns the firm. When consumers cannot observe the 
quality of the final products even after purchasing and consuming the goods (credence 
goods), it is not clear whether the firm has a proper incentive to maintain the high quality 
level. However, if consumers doubt the quality of the final products and try to form 
a rational expectation of it, the firm can try to send a signal of the real quality of its 
products to the consumers (e.g., through price or advertisement), and consequently will 
have a proper incentive to produce high quality products. 
19Shiraishi (1985a). 
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Hiruzen Ranchers' Cooperative in Okayama prefecture has a corporate strat-
egy to produce pure jersey milk by using only the raw milk extracted from 
their own jersey milch cows. 20 One prominent reason in Japan why the 
milk made by agriculture cooperatives attracts consumers' popularity seems 
to be the consumers' strong desire for safe milk. Japanese consumers have 
experienced several polluted milk cases, and have become especially alert in 
the safety of milk and dairy products. 21 Knowing the nature of raw milk, 
and equipped with labor intensive production facilities, agriculture coopera-
tives seem to be in an advantageous position to keep safety, or more generally 
high quality, of their products, compared to their large stock company coun-
terparts. Informational advantage on raw livestock products thus seems to 
be an important factor that motivates agriculture cooperatives to undertake 
meat and dairy product manufacturing. 
Canned and preserved fruit and vegetable products except pickled vegetables 
[1231] 
The category of bottling and canning of fruits and vegetables in Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (1997) roughly corresponds to the di-
vision of canned and preserved fruit and vegetable products except pickled 
vegetables [1231] of the SIC (Tables 1 and 3). The agriculture cooperatives' 
sales of vegetable and fruit products (excluding pickles) amount to 29.3 bil-
lion yen, which constitutes 14.9% of the total sales of their processed goods 
20Takenaka (1985a). 
21The most serious case of polluted milk is the Morinaga Arsenic-contaminated Milk 
Case that took place in 1955. Sodium secondary phosphate for industry use was used 
by mistake as a food additive in powdered milk for babies in a factory of Morinaga Milk 
Industry Co.. Then, the powdered milk got contaminated with deadly arsenious acid, 
which was contained in the sodium secondary phosphate. As the result, 130 babies were 
killed and more than 12,000 babies were seriously injured by the milk. See Kawana (1989), 
chapter 5, for the details of this case. 
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(Table 1). The employee ratio of cooperative (and other types of noncapital-
istic) firms in this industry group is 9.4% (Table 3, Ratio 2). 
Factories for the processing of fruits and vegetables are usually built in 
inland areas near the place of crop production. For instance, canned tanger-
ines are produced in Nagasaki prefecture, the major area for tangerine pro-
duction; canned peaches in Yamagata prefecture, the major area for peach 
production; and canned pineapples in Okinawa prefecture, the major area for 
pineapple production. 22 The advantages of operating factories at the place 
of production for raw fruits and vegetables are to keep the freshness of the 
raw products, and presumably to save on transportation costs. Such on-the-
spot production implies that the factories for vegetable and fruit products 
that are located far from urban areas have more or less a site specificity. 
This suggests that, if the transaction of a raw agricultural product that is 
cropped in a local area is terminated, the factories are of little use. 23 In 
addition, the value of physical assets per establishment is 177 million yen in 
this industry, which is not negligible (Table 3, Capital). In this circumstance, 
investment in production facilities tends to become lower than the efficient 
level due to possible termination of trade of the raw agricultural products. 
This inefficiency can be prevented if farmers themselves own the factories 
and undertake the processing of the fruits and vegetables they crop. 
Similarly to the case of raw meat and milk discussed in the previous sub-
22Japan Food Journal (1997), volume 2, pp. 342-344. 
23It is told, in theory, that termination of trade in local agricultural products would come 
from the strategic behavior of farmers. In practice, however, holding back investment in a 
rural community can arise even in the absence of farmers' intentional termination of trade. 
For instance, production of the raw agricultural products may decrease in the near future 
due to the lack of successors for the farm. Or, even if currently there is a large demand 
for a processed food of a local agricultural product, the boom may be over soon. In either 
case, the production facilities that are once built in the countryside become devaluated, 
and this backwardly prevents investment in the local community. 
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section, another incentive for agriculture cooperatives to engage in processing 
of their fruits and vegetables may come from their informational advantage 
in producing differentiated or high quality products. For the obvious rea-
sons, farmers are well informed about the characteristics and quality of their 
crops. In addition, agriculture cooperatives are usually endowed with small 
scale processing facilities, and their methods of processing fruits and veg-
etables are necessarily highly labor intensive. These properties (a sufficient 
knowledge on the quality of raw fruits and vegetables, and labor intensive 
production methods) can give agriculture cooperatives an advantage in pro-
ducing a small amount and wide variety of high quality products. For in-
stance, it is the policy of the Oita Oyama-machi Agriculture Cooperative in 
Oita prefecture to use only their own agricultural products as inputs, and not 
to make a large scale investment in production facilities but to rely mostly on 
human hands to produce homemade-like products. Despite its small organi-
zational size with just 690 farmers, the cooperative produces over 40 kinds of 
processed fruit and vegetable products, such as strawberry jam, plum jam, 
plum jelly, marmalade, etc.. In order to maintain their brand name recog-
nition for high quality products, the cooperative has a sales strategy not to 
supply their products to the supermarkets and other discount stores but to 
wholesale only to the department stores and prestigious consumer coopera-
tives. 24 Informational advantages in the quality of raw products thus seem 
to be a reason for agriculture cooperatives to engage in the manufacturing 
of fruit and vegetable products. 
Lastly, the fact that the factories for processmg fruits and vegetables 
are built near the location of crop production may imply that the cost of 
monitoring for agriculture cooperatives is low in this industry. Geographical 
24Masui (1985). 
12 
propinquity makes it possible for farmers to check frequently on the opera-
tions of the factories, and therefore the factory workers are likely to be put 
under a close watch by the directors and other members of the agriculture 
cooperati ves. 
Starch [1292] 
The category of starch and potato processing in Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (1997) roughly corresponds to the division of starch 
[1292] of the SIC (Tables 1 and 3). 25 The item in this industry group 
where agriculture cooperatives have a substantial market share is potato 
starch. Over 90% of all starch and other potato products manufactured by 
agriculture cooperatives is produced by agriculture cooperatives in Hokkaido 
prefecture. The agriculture cooperatives' sales of starch and potato products 
amount to 37.5 billion yen, which constitutes 19.0% of the total sales of their 
processed goods (Table 1). As of 1991,67 (5.6%) agriculture cooperatives and 
22 (5.6%) stock companies funded by agriculture cooperatives were engaged 
in the production of starch (Table 2). The employee ratio of cooperative (and 
other types of non capitalistic) firms in this industry group is 8.0% (Table 3, 
Ratio 2). 
Historically, avoiding market power seems to have been a major reason for 
agriculture cooperatives to undertake the manufacturing of starch. A promi-
nent instance is observed in the potato processing by the Shihoro Agriculture 
Cooperative in Hokkaido prefecture. Until the Second World War, the potato 
farmers in the village of Sihoro had long struggled with low price and un-
fair terms of trade in the transaction of potatoes with independent starch 
25Potato products such as French fries and potato chips in the category of starch and 
potato processing in Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (1997) are not included 
in starch [1292] of the SIC. 
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manufacturers in the community. 26 After the Second World War, the agri-
culture cooperative in the village bought out a factory from an independent 
starch manufacturer and began processing the potatoes they produced. The 
principal objective of the factory was to establish a stable and fair transac-
tional relationship with the potato farmers. Potato processing by agriculture 
cooperatives has attracted wide popularity among the potato farmers, and 
today the scope of potato processing is not confined to starch production but 
has expanded to French fries and potato chips. 27 Preventing monopsonistic 
power thus seems to have been an incentive for agriculture cooperatives to 
engage in the manufacturing of starch and other potato products. 
Site-specificity of the potato processing facilities could be another reason 
for potato farmers to undertake this business. Farming of potatoes and 
production of potato starch are concentrated in Hokkaido prefecture. About 
77% (or 2,.597 thousand tons) of the total domestic production of potatoes 
(which is 3,365 thousand tons) were produced in Hokkaido prefecture in 199.5, 
and, as it is seen above, more than 90 percent of the potato starch made by 
agriculture cooperatives is processed in this region. Taking into account the 
rather large amount of physical assets for production (which is 335 million 
yen, or 3.04 million dollars, per establishment; see Table 3, Capital), we can 
imagine that the potato farming villages of the prefecture have had difficulty 
in introducing a new investment in potato processing facilities into the village. 
It may thus be a possibility that agriculture cooperatives of potato farmers in 
Hokkaido prefecture have come to own the factories themselves and engage 
in potato processing in order to cope with the underinvestment problems. 
260ne reason for the presence of stubborn local market power such as this case can be 
that the Japanese Fair Trade Commission has conventionally taken a mild stance in the 




The manufacturing of tea leaves consists of two stages: processing the raw 
tea leaves into crude tea leaves, and refining the crude tea leaves into final 
tea leaves. The category of tea refining (both crude and final) in Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (1997) corresponds to the division of 
tea [1331] of the SIC (Tables 1 and 3). The agriculture cooperatives' sales of 
tea refining amount to 23.8 billion yen, which constitutes 12.1% of the total 
sales of their processed goods (Table 1). Overall, agriculture cooperatives 
have a substantial share in the production of crude tea leaves, but have 
only a limited share in the production of final tea leaves. As of 1991, 159 
(13.2%) agriculture cooperatives and 39 (9.9%) stock companies funded by 
agriculture cooperatives were engaged in the production of crude tea leaves, 
whereas 134 (11.1 %) agriculture cooperatives and 26 (6.6%) stock companies 
funded by agriculture cooperatives were engaged in the production of final tea 
leaves (Table 2). The product in this category which agriculture cooperatives 
primarily deal with is green tea leaves. 
There are a great many number of tea leaf manufacturers, and the concen-
tration rate of the industry is low. 28 However, this does not mean that there 
is no serious market power in the transaction of tea leaves. Manufacturing 
and distribution of tea leaves have a long history in Japanese society, and 
its distribution system is said to be extremely conservative and closed. That 
is, major local tea leaf refiners/wholesalers have dominated the transaction 
of tea leaves and have exercised strong monopsony power over the tea leaf 
farmers. 29 There are several reasons that have created such industry charac-
28There are 3,200 green tea manufacturers, and CR3 is 13.3% for green tea, unpacked, 




teristics. First, final tea leaf is a product that is highly differentiated. There 
is a wide diversity of preferences for tea according to area. For instance, 
green tea with a strong taste is preferred in Shizuoka prefecture; one with a 
somewhat raw taste is preferred in Kyoto prefecture; and one with a steamed 
taste is preferred in Osaka prefecture. One kind of green tea that is favored 
in an area is even minutely classified into smaller sorts. 30 Green tea is not 
only locally (or horizontally) differentiated but also vertically differentiated 
to a large extent. The quality grades of green tea are determined mainly 
by the time of picking the raw tea leaves. For instance, in Shizuoka prefec-
ture, Japan's largest raw tea leaf planting and final tea leaf producing area, 
the raw tea leaves that are picked in the earliest time (the highest grade), 
the second earliest time (the second highest grade), the third earliest time 
(the third highest grade), and the fourth earliest time (the fourth highest 
grade), were priced at 484, 111,79, and 38 yen, respectively, per kilogram in 
1995. 31 Each grade is further minutely divided into several subgrades. 32 
Because of such a fine horizontal and vertical differentiation, the market for 
tea leaves has been partitioned into small and closed local markets, and in 
each differentiated market a refiner/wholesaler has been in an easy position 
to exercise market power over the tea leaf farmers (monopolistic competi-
tion). Second, similarly to the case of raw milk, raw tea leaves quickly decay 
once they are picked, and therefore must be processed soon after the harvest. 
300hishi (1983), chapter I, section 1. 
31Fuchinoue and Fuchinoue (1999), chapter 5, section 2, subsection 2. 
32 According to different data on Shizuoka prefecture during the three years from 1970 
to 1972, green tea leaves that were picked at the beginning period, the middle period, and 
the final period, of the earliest time (the highest grade) were priced, on average, at 350, 
192, and 166 yen, respectively, per kilogram. Similarly, green tea leaves that were picked 
at the beginning period, the middle period, and the final period, of the second earliest time 
(the second highest grade) were priced at 117, 90, and 76 yen, respectively, per kilogram. 
See Fuchinoue and Fuchinoue (1999), chapter 5, section 2, subsection 2. 
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Consequently, price elasticity of supply of raw tea leaves is necessarily low, 
and this creates a market environment in which monopsony power is easily 
exercised. 33 34 For these two reasons (minute differentiation of kinds and 
quality, and low price elasticity of supply), the market for raw tea leaves is 
not so competitive as it might appear when referring to the statistical data, 
but rather it is judged quite monopsonitic. It can thus be imagined that 
tea leaf processing by agriculture cooperatives has been a measure to avoid 
strong monopsonistic power imposed on them by the downstream firms in 
the local market. 
Tea leaf farmers' knowledge of the features of raw tea leaves can gIVe a 
business advantage to agriculture cooperatives in the manufacturing of tea 
leaves. In particular, quality control of tea leaves seems relatively easy if they 
were processed in a vertically integrated line of agriculture cooperatives, from 
growing raw tea leaves to manufacturing final tea leaves. Indeed, it has been 
33Presumably because of such unstable quality of raw tea leaves, a commercial custom 
has been created that raw tea leaves which are picked by the farmers are immediately 
handed over by farmers to manufacturers without a definite agreement on price. The price 
is later determined when the manufacturers recognize the quality of the tea leaves. In the 
ex post determination of the price, the manufacturers keep a dominant bargaining position, 
and there is no help for the farmers but to accept the price offered by the manufacturers. 
In a year of a good harvest, the manufacturers assign a quota on the amount of raw tea 
leaves they buy from farmers, and refuse to buy any additional quantity. Farmers are 
thus in a weak position against manufacturers in the transaction of raw tea leaves. See 
Fuchinoue and Fuchinoue (1999), chapter 5, section 2, subsection 4. 
34In contrast to the perishable property of raw tea leaves, crude tea leaves can be 
preserved for an extended period of time. The crude tea leaf producers can therefore keep 
their products in cold storage and supply them to the market when the price is favorable 
to them. In addition, since raw tea leaves become about one-fifth in size when they are 
processed into crude tea leaves, it is less costly to transport crude tea leaves than to convey 
raw tea leaves. This makes it easy for the crude tea leaf producers to sell their products to 
the distant refiners outside the community. (See Fuchinoue and Fuchinoue (1999), chapter 
5, section 2, subsection 4.) For these reasons, it seems that monopsonistic power is less 
easily exercised in the market for crude tea leaves than in the market for raw tea leaves. 
This may partly explain the reason why agriculture cooperatives actively engage in the 
processing of raw tea leaves but not so earnestly in the processing of crude tea leaves. 
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a custom of the industry not to label the information on the packages of 
final tea leaves, such as the place of production of the raw tea leaves or 
processing site of the tea leaves. It is reported that tea leaves made by the 
Kanagawa Prefectural Economic Federation of Agriculture Cooperatives have 
attracted wide popularity among consumers by revealing such information 
on its packages. 35 A reason behind this may be that consumers have a 
desire for safety information, such as the type and amount (or frequency) 
of agricultural chemicals that are used in growing the raw tea leaves. This 
information can easily be obtained and labeled on the packages if the tea 
leaves are produced in a vertically integrated line of agriculture cooperatives. 
Informational asymmetry thus can be a nonnegligible factor that promotes 
tea leaf processing by agriculture cooperatives. 
Agriculture cooperatives also seem to have some advantages in tea leaf 
processing with respect to bearing risks. There is only a little variation in 
profits from tea leaf processing over the past decade (Table 3, Variance). In 
addition, tea leaf processing facilities are quite small in size compared with 
other food manufacturing businesses (Table 3, Capital). In such an industrial 
circumstance, the farmers' cost from bearing risks that are associated with 
tea leaf processing is considered relatively small, and this makes it easy for 
agriculture cooperatives to engage in the tea leaf production. 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the economic reasons for the advancement 
of agriculture cooperatives into food manufacturing business. We have seen 
that the reasons for agriculture cooperatives to engage in the processing 
of raw agricultural products vary across food categories, depending on the 
350hshima (1985). 
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market structure, location of the processing facilities, type and degree of in-
formational asymmetry on the quality of raw agricultural products, stability 
of earnings, etc .. 
Among the various factors that determine the efficient form of food man-
ufacturing enterprise, the role of asymmetric information on the quality of 
raw agricultural products seems to be worth paying special attention to in 
understanding the characteristics of food manufacturing industries in Japan. 
There are two notable features for the food supply system in Japan. First, 
the country heavily depends upon the imports of raw materials for food from 
overseas, and secondly, consumers have a solid preference for high quality 
and, in particular, safe foods. Generally speaking, imported raw agricultural 
products are less costly for firms to use as the factor of production compared 
with domestic ones, reflecting a large scale and capital intensive agriculture 
overseas in contrast to a small scale and labor intensive domestic agricul-
ture. Major food manufacturing companies then typically use economical 
imported raw agricultural products as input, and produce a large volume of 
standardized products in large scale and capital intensive plants. In contrast, 
agriculture cooperatives use costly domestic (i.e., their own) raw agricultural 
products as input, and produce a small volume of differentiated products in 
small scale and labor intensive facilities. Consequently, the final products 
of agriculture cooperatives are necessarily priced higher in the market than 
those of large manufacturing companies. Nevertheless, supported by the 
consumers who wish to obtain high quality and safe foods, the products of 
agriculture cooperatives steadily maintain a certain competitiveness in the 
market. This may explain why Japanese food manufacturing industries of-
ten exhibit a bi-polar concentration structure (where standardized national 
brands and differentiated local brands coexist in a single market), and the 
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number of enterprises is great many while the size of each enterprise is quite 
small compared with those of western developed countries. 36 37 In sum, it 
seems a structural characteristic of Japanese food manufacturing industries 
that a small number of major manufacturing companies supply standardized 
products at a moderate price, whereas a large number of minor manufactur-
ers, including agriculture cooperatives, supply differentiated products at a 
higher price. 
36 As for bi-polar concentration structure of Japanese food manufacturing industries, see 
Tokoyama and Egaitsu (1995): 
37 As of 1982, the number of all food manufacturing enterprises was 80,802 in Japan, 
whereas it was 26,887 in the United States, 6,747 in Britain, 4,653 in West Germany, and 
3,485 in Australia. The average number of employees per enterprise was 15 in Japan, 
whereas it was 58 in the United States, 97 in Britain, 102 in West Germany, and 51 in 
Australia. See Onodera (1987). 
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Items Sales Ratio 
Rice & barley polishing 11.130,599 6.0 
Milling 4,013.180 2.0 
Starch & potato processing 37,452,481 19.0 
Pickles manufacturing 14,956,589 7.6 
Soy bean paste & sauce 1,917,377 1.0 
Bottling & canning of fruits & vegetables 29,304,532 14.9 
Meat processing 24,031.138 12.2 
Milk processing 24,484,349 12.4 
Tea refining 23,781,148 12.1 
Fertilizer 1,955,739 1.0 
Feed 1,382,837 0.7 
Others 21,972,116 11.2 
Total 196,997,752 100.0 
Table 1: 
Sales (thousand yen) and ratio (%) of processed goods & by-products of 872 agriculture 
cooperatives. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (1997). 
Note: Sales by firms in joint stock company form are not included. 
Items Agriculture Joint stock Women's Voluntary 
cooperatives company section group 
# % # % # % # % 
Starch 67 5.6 22 5.6 5 0.7 19 1.4 
Pickled vegetables 395 32.8 128 32.7 341 49.1 550 39.9 
Soft drinks 151 12.6 49 12.5 57 8.2 108 7.8 
Jam 69 5.7 28 7.1 118 17.0 188 13.6 
Noodles 52 4.3 72 18.4 22 3.2 177 12.8 
Rice products 125 10.4 35 8.9 63 9.1 135 9.8 
Confectioneries 26 2.2 74 18.9 50 7.2 204 14.8 
Canned & preserved food 140 11.6 72 18.4 74 10.6 172 12.5 
Alcoholic beverages 31 2.6 99 25.3 2 0.3 103 7.5 
Soy bean paste 484 40.2 86 21.9 435 62.6 508 36.9 
Soy bean sauce 76 6.3 74 18.9 25 3.6 117 8.5 
Seasonings except soy bean paste & sauce 35 2.9 14 3.6 21 3.0 43 3.1 
Bean curd 89 7.4 126 32.1 84 12.1 490 35.6 
Meat products 43 3.6 63 16.1 8 1.2 90 6.5 
Milk 35 2.9 65 16.6 5 0.7 70 5.1 
Dairy products except milk 11 0.9 32 8.2 9 1.3 21 1.5 
Green tea (crude) 159 13.2 39 9.9 1 0.1 186 13.5 
Green tea (refined) 134 11.1 26 6.6 1 0.1 174 12.6 
Tea excpet green tea 67 5.6 18 4.6 5 0.7 107 7.8 
Food boiled down in soy sauce 39 3.2 37 9.4 48 6.9 98 7.1 
Others 279 23.2 49 12.5 57 8.2 166 12.0 
Total 1,203 100.0 392 100.0 695 100.0 1,378 100.0 
Table 2: 
Food processing by agriculture cooperatives. Central Union of Agriculture Cooperatives (1991). 
Code Industry Raio 1 Ratio 2 Capital Variance 
121 Livestock products 6.1 7.1 
1211 Meat products 4.3 342.Q3 15.02 
1212 Dairy products 9.0 754.46 19.52 
1219 Others 9.3 162.48 87.49 
122 Seafood products 2.5 2.9 
1221 Canned fish and seafoods 2.3 188.18 188.18 
1222 Seaweed products 2.2 72.05 72.05 
1223 Agar-agar n.a. 121.29 121.29 
1224 Fish sausages n.a. 572.57 572.57 
1225 Prepared seafood products 7.6 141.44 141.44 
1226 Frozen fish and seafoods 9.5 217.85 217.85 
1227 Frozen seafood products 4.1 124.16 124.16 
1229 Others n.a. 65.69 65.69 
123 Canned & preserved fruit & vegetable products 6.9 6.1 
1231 Except pickled vegetables 9.4 176.76 12.93 
1232 Pickled vegetables 3.9 94.67 19.73 
124 Seasonings 2.5 2.6 
1241 Soy bean paste 4.2 133.75 20.93 
1242 Soy bean sauce 6.7 182.14 15.10 
1243 Chemical seasonings 0.0 3110.11 218.75 
1244 Sauce mix 0.0 627.21 94.81 
1245 Vinegar 1.6 175.49 127.53 
1249 Others 0.0 686.36 16.42 
125 Sugar processing 4.2 n.a. 
1251 Cane sugar, except refining n.a. 850.18 671.68 
1252 Cane sugar refining 0.0 1591.34 36.01 
1253 Glucose 0.0 1899.92 206.66 
126 Flour & grain mill products 6.9 8.9 
1261 Rice polishing 22.0 313.67 172.42 
1262 Wheat polishing 0.0 402.93 486.85 
1263 Flour 0.0 1272.65 124.53 
1269 Others 0.0 101.94 260.66 
127 Bakery & confectionary products 0.6 0.0 
1271 Bread 1.2 283.04 13.16 
1272 Cakes 0.0 113.21 20.31 
1273 Biscuits and crackers 1.5 133.30 32.35 
1274 Rice crackers n.a. 161.09 14.13 
1279 Others n.a. 288.53 21.88 
128 Animal & vegetable oil & fats 1.1 1.8 
1281 Vegetable oils 8.7 1443.42 46.86 
1282 Animal oils 0.0 161.44 152.57 
1289 Table oils 2969.57 413.07 
129 Miscellaneous foods & related products 1.8 1.7 
1291 Yeast 9.8 316.98 452.90 
1292 Starch 23.1 334.80 103.61 
1293 Noodles 0.0 79.59 26.82 
1294 Malt n.a. 105.34 30.40 
1295 Bean curd, fried bean curd 3.1 50.16 22.34 
1296 Sweet bean paste 2.9 50.22 29.80 
1297 Frozen prepared foods 3.0 332.60 65.81 
1298 Prepared foods 0.0 144.49 55.11 
1299 Others n.a. 151.24 28.22 
131 Soft drinks & carbonate water 7.9 11.8 
1311 Soft drinks & carbonated water 11.8 967.72 102.76 
132 Alcoholic beverages 1.0 0.0 
1321 Wines 8.7 219.67 34.99 
1322 Beer 0.0 16562.77 24.02 
1323 Sake (Rice wines) 0.0 196.89 11.16 
1324 Distilled & blended liquors 3.0 641.55 22.37 
133 Tea & coffee 19.9 n.a. 
1331 Tea n.a. 54.80 13.04 
1332 Coffee n.a. 418.90 169.81 
Table 3: 
Ratio 1: Employee ratio of cooperatives (%). Management and Coordination Agency (1998). 
Ratio 2: Employee ratio of cooperatives (%). Ministry of International Trade and Industry (1998). 
Capital: Fixed capital assets per establishment (million yen). Ministry of International Trade and Industry (1998). 
Variance: Variance of rates of change in gross added values, 1988-1997. Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (1998). 















Figure 1: Ownership structure of a food manufacturing firm. Food manufacturing by 
an agriculture cooperative is the form of enterprise in which farmers own the firm 
as the suppliers of raw agricultural products, whereas labor input, capital input 
and output are traded through the market. 
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